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Do Falsifiers Leave Traces? 





Fraud by interviewers is a ubiquitous threat to data quality in survey practice, whenever 
face-to-face surveys are conducted. Particularly if interviewers use stereotypes about re-
spondents to fill in questionnaires, falsifications can limit the variety of possible answers, 
lead erroneously to significant correlations and distort survey results.
In addition to external control mechanisms to detect fraud (such as postcards or time 
stamps) more recent research has started to also consider internal indicators (such as the 
number of missing values or open answers) as a monitoring strategy. This latter approach 
relies on ex-post statistical analyses and implicitly assumes that falsifiers apply rational 
behavioral strategies which result in detectable response patterns. This study examines to 
what extent fieldwork monitoring can benefit from such approaches, by empirically assess-
ing how effective different indicators are at detecting known cases of fabrication.
In contrast to most previous research, which often relies on laboratory fabrications, this 
study uses authentic cases of detected interviewer fraud from a survey on the fairness of 
earnings conducted in Germany. The main goal of this study is to examine to what extent 
the falsifiers’ attempts to produce unsuspicious data led to recognizable response patterns. 
For this purpose, we test a wide range of indicators that could potentially identify falsifica-
tions: avoidance of extreme categories and open text-based answers, low rates of item-non-
response, strategic use of filter questions to shorten the questionnaire and non-compliance 
of responses to numeric questions with Benford‘s Law. Furthermore, we compare authentic 
and fabricated interviews according to their values on a social desirability scale and report 
results from an innovative trick question that was especially designed to detect falsifiers.
Keywords: interviewer falsification, interviewer fraud, interviewer effects, response pat-
terns, statistical methods, data quality
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Interviewer Falsifications as an Omnipresent but Seldomly 
Discussed Topic
Whenever interviewers are employed to collect survey data, researchers have to 
face the problem that their interviewers do not necessarily follow the same inter-
ests as they do. In fact, the interviewers‘ goals might even contradict the research-
ers‘ in many aspects (Winker 2016). While researchers are interested in unbiased 
data, ideally obtained from random samples with high response rates, interviewers 
might, in the worst case, aim to waste as little time as possible to conduct the nec-
essary amount of interviews. Delivering quality data might not be their primary 
concern. In his book on 19 years of professional experience as an interviewer, Dor-
roch reports how interviewers complete their daily tasks with the least investment 
of effort and time possible (Dorroch 1994). Apart from being a nightmare for every 
researcher, his narration clearly points out that, from an interviewer’s perspective, 
deviating from the interviewer guidelines and falsifying data can be a very benefi-
cial rational decision. 
Estimates of the actual amount of fabricated data in surveys vary to some 
extent, but most authors assume a share of between less than one and seven per-
cent (Finn & Ranchhod 2017; Koch 1995; Schräpler & Wagner 2003; Schnell 1991; 
Schreiner, Pennie, & Newbrough 1988), while some mention possible numbers of 
above 50 percent depending on the survey and its supervision capacities (De Haas 
& Winker 2016). 
Although data falsification is an omnipresent problem in survey research and 
sometimes even receives some attention in popular media (as in a prominent feature 
by the German Spiegel magazine in February 2018), little scientific literature has 
focused on the topic. This is particularly surprising because previous research has 
shown that fabricated data can systematically bias survey results: Schnell (1991) 
quantifies the potential threat of falsifications for data quality by varying the share 
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of (laboratory) fabrications in a data set. He concludes that a share of five percent 
hardly affects univariate analyses. Multivariate analyses, however, were much more 
susceptible to bias (also see Reuband 1990). This paper therefore aims to contribute 
to a debate that we consider necessary in order to find an adequate way of dealing 
with falsification by interviewers.
Survey agencies and researchers usually apply a variety of monitoring strat-
egies to deal with potential interviewer fraud (AAPOR 2003; Murphy, Biemer, 
Stringer, Thissen, Day, & Hsieh 2016). For our purposes, it is sufficient to distin-
guish between what we will call external and internal control mechanisms: 
  External control mechanisms are external to the substantive answers in the ques-
tionnaire. Widely used techniques include recontacting respondents via postcard 
or phone call (e.g. Koch 1995: 91f), the storage of paradata such as time stamps 
to determine the length of an interview (e.g. Hood & Bushery 1997: 820f) or the 
number of conducted interviews per day (Bushery, Reichert, Albright, & Ros-
siter 1999: 317f) and the time gap between them. Some authors suggest that more 
experienced interviewers might use more sophisticated forms of falsifications 
(Schreiner et al. 1988), a consideration that leads Hood & Bushery (1997) to keep 
track of suspiciously high numbers of ineligible households that the interviewer 
might have misclassified to avoid hard-to-reach respondents. Less common but 
promising observational methods such as audio recordings or GPS tracking also 
belong to this category (Thissen 2014; Thissen & Myers 2016; Wagner, Olson, 
& Edgar 2017).
  Internal control mechanisms refer to statistical ex-post analyses of the sub-
stantive answers from the questionnaire. In contrast to external control mecha-
nisms, the analysis of internal response patterns aims to develop a technique that 
can identify falsifications merely on the basis of the completed questionnaires 
themselves (e.g. Bredl, Winker, & Kötschau 2012; De Haas & Winker 2016; 
Kosyakova, Olbrich, Sakshaug, & Schwanhäuser 2019). This more controversial 
approach draws on rational choice theory and the assumption that the falsifier’s 
attempt to produce unobtrusive and unsuspicious data results in certain recog-
nizable response patterns. 
Internal control mechanisms are not meant to replace external checks. Rather, they 
are a cost-efficient supplement to external control mechanisms that can be useful to 
preselect suspicious interviewers for further, more targeted examination.
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Research Objective and Approach: Do Falsifiers Leave 
Traces?
So far there is no scientific consensus on a superior monitoring strategy to deal 
with interviewer fraud (Murphy et al. 2016). Instead there is a variety of coexist-
ing measures that either aim to prevent or retrospectively discover falsifications, 
particularly when it comes to internal control mechanisms, that is, indicators that 
are internal to the collected questionnaire data. Some authors have suggested prin-
cipal component analysis to examine similar response patterns on ordinal response 
scales (Blasius & Thiessen 2013) or cluster analyses that combine several statistical 
indicators to identify interviewers at risk (e.g. Bredl et al. 2012). However, these 
latter approaches often suffer from a high number of false positives, particularly in 
settings where the individual interviewers complete few interviews and the share 
of fraudulent interviewers is low (De Haas & Winker 2014; Storfinger & Winker 
2013) and no a priori restriction on the number of falsifiers is defined (De Haas & 
Winker 2016). In addition, it is unclear which indicators are best suited for cluster 
analyses (see Menold, Winker, Storfinger, & Kemper 2013 for a simulation study 
testing different combinations of indicators on a laboratory sample with 50% falsi-
fications).
As will be argued in more detail in the following section, the little research 
that empirically tests such indicators has produced somewhat contradictory results. 
This paper therefore focuses on statistical ex-post analyses of response patterns and 
examines to what extent the response patterns in fabricated data reflect the typi-
cally assumed ‘rational’ interviewer behavior that translates into detectable pecu-
liarities: Do falsifiers leave traces that make them identifiable?
We will empirically test five internal indicators using a survey on the fair-
ness of earnings in Germany. These data are particularly suitable for the present 
research, because they contain (at least) 44 authentic cases of interviewer fraud, 
which can be tested for typical response patterns. Apart from more conventional 
external control mechanisms, such as control postcards and time stamps (by which 
these falsifications were discovered), the questionnaire also contained a trick ques-
tion on the income inequality in Europe. This rather innovative attempt to identify 
falsifiers merely by their response patterns will be discussed in more detail later on. 
A major limitation of most previous studies on interviewer falsifications is that 
they rely on artificial laboratory experiments, in which arbitrarily chosen respon-
dents (often university students) are asked to fabricate data (for a recent exception 
see Schwanhäuser, Sakshaug, Kosyakova, & Kreuter 2020). It is a crucial advan-
tage that the data at hand allow us to analyze data from authentic interviewers with 
intentions to fake data in a real life situation. 
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Previous Research
Types of Interviewer Fraud
Generally, interviewer fraud is defined as an intentional deviation from the inter-
viewer guidelines (AAPOR 2003; Gwartney 2013). These deviations can occur at 
different steps of the interview process and vary in their degree of severity (for 
an extensive list see Murphy et al. 2016). The AAPOR (2003) talks about “a con-
tinuum of severity of falsification” (page 2). For the purpose of this study, milder 
forms of interviewer deviations such as rephrasing questions, failing to record ver-
batims or allowing refusal and item-nonresponse will not be discussed in more 
detail. Although focus group interviews among interviewers suggest that such 
minor deviations are the most common type of interviewer falsification (Nelson & 
Kiecker 1996), it can be hard to determine in an individual case if e.g. by rephras-
ing, an interviewer intended to help a respondent or to falsify data. 
Leaving minor interviewer deviations aside, Schnell (1991) distinguishes 
between three essential types of falsifications, into which most other classifications 
(e.g. AAPOR 2003; Schreiner et al. 1988) can be condensed:
  complete falsifications, meaning that the interviewer fills in the whole question-
naire without contacting the designated respondent
  partial falsifications, for which the interviewer collects some crucial informa-
tion, either directly from the respondent or from someone who knows him/her, 
in order to complete the remaining questions alone
  cases in which the random procedure to select respondents is ignored, meaning 
that instead of the target subject someone else is interviewed or the eligibility of 
a potential hard-to-reach respondent is misreported
The three types of interviewer fraud differ in two aspects: In how demanding it is 
(for the interviewer) to produce them and in how demanding it is (for the researcher) 
to detect them (Schnell 1991: 27-29). This last distinction is crucial for this paper 
insofar as falsifications that ignore the random selection process are impossible to 
discover solely by means of statistical ex-post analyses of the data. Real respon-
dents will produce unsuspicious response patterns no matter if they were part of the 
random sample or not. Hints for this specific kind of fraud can only be gained with 
the aid of external control mechanisms. As a consequence, the approach presented 
here will only be helpful for the identification of certain types of falsifications. At 
the same time, the analyses of response patterns cannot be - and do not intend to 
be - a replacement for external control mechanisms but a first step to identify suspi-
cious cases. Moreover, partial falsifications will be harder to identify than complete 
falsifications. For partial falsifications, detection will be easier to accomplish the 
larger the falsified fraction of questions within an interview (De Haas & Winker 
2014).
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Interviewer Fraud as a Rational Behavior
Fraud can be considered the result of a rational decision process, in which the inter-
viewers react to the situational circumstances they encounter. According to sub-
jective expected utility theory (Kroneberg & Kalter 2012; Esser 1999: 247-275), a 
wide version of rational choice theory, such a decision process is a function of the 
following factors:
  the alternative actions to choose from
  the subjective utilities associated with these alternatives
  the costs associated with each alternative
  the perceived probability that an action can actually be carried out and thus 
leads to the expected utility
The worst case scenario from a researcher’s perspective would be an interviewer 
who aims to complete the job in as little time and with as little effort as possible. 
In line with theoretical assumptions, the respective survey literature has identified 
a variety of circumstances that might make fraud more likely. Gwartney (2013) 
argues that “calculating cynics” (page 203) who fake frequently and systematically 
are rare in practice. She believes that most interviewers rather fake occasionally, 
when their ethics break down in difficult situations. However, she acknowledges 
that the interviewers’ working environment can strongly encourage them to deviate 
from instructions. Already decades ago, Crespi (1945) argued that researchers and 
survey agencies can change the “demoralising” circumstances, in which interview-
ers make their decisions. Similarly, Koch pointed out in the 1990s that it would be 
wrong to solely blame the interviewers. He considered defective interviewer train-
ing, long and poorly designed questionnaires, and meagre salaries a part of the 
problem (Koch 1995: 102). Gwartney (2013) adds complicated sampling procedures 
and software, performance and deadline pressures, and a lack of appreciation and 
support from fieldwork agencies to the list. Interesting empirical evidence for these 
problems is provided by a qualitative study among interviewers (Nelson & Kiecker 
1996) and a field experiment that manipulates the interviewers’ working conditions 
(Menold, Landrock, Winker, Pellner, & Kemper 2018). In addition, some recent 
work highlights the importance of work ethics and moral values which should be 
articulated by researchers and supervisory staff (AAPOR 2003; Gwartney 2013; 
Murphy et al. 2016).
Empirical Evidence on Suspicious Response Patterns
It has been suggested that interviewers do not only act rationally when they make 
the decision to (or not to) falsify, but also while they are trying to produce unsus-
picious data: “Interviewers who falsify will try to keep it simple and fabricate a 
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minimum of falsified data” (Hood & Bushery 1997: 820). If this is the case, faked 
data would show statistically detectable differences to properly completed ques-
tionnaires. The underlying question is how interviewers fabricate, that is, which 
typical response patterns make them identifiable by statistical analyses. When dis-
cussing the issue, researchers commonly refer to the same response patterns in line 
with the assumption of a rationally acting falsifier. The empirical evidence on these 
response patterns, however, is far from conclusive. Results from different studies 
are often inconsistent and sometimes clearly contradictory. 
The response patterns that are typically expected from falsifiers will now be 
discussed in more detail, referring to previous studies that tested or used such pat-
terns as indicators for fraud. The aim of the following section is twofold: It will 
introduce the internal indicators that will be empirically tested later on and it gives 
a first rough impression about how the indicators performed in fraud detection in 
the literature to date. 
Nonconformity with Benford’s Law (1)
Benford’s Law implies that multi-digit numbers are more likely to start with a small 
than with a high digit (Benford 1938, Diekmann & Jann 2010). The frequency that 
a is the first digit in multi-digit numbers follows the distribution:
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What makes Benford’s Law a potentially helpful tool for fraud detection is that 
it is perceived as “quite counterintuitive” (Nigrini 1999): Falsifiers should expect 
equal frequencies for all possible first digits in a number. Based on this assumption, 
Benford’s Law has not only been used for fraud detection in survey data but also 
in regression coefficients of journal publications (Bauer & Gross 2011; Diekmann 
2007). The extent to which values comply with Benford’s Law is then assessed by a 
chi-squared test, measuring the difference between the observed and the expected 
distribution.
Various studies examine monetary values to identify falsifiers in the German 
Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP): While Schäfer, Schräpler, Müller, & Wagner 
(2005) and Schräpler (2011) are mildly positive about their results, Schräpler & 
Wagner (2003) describe the method as “not efficient”. Interestingly, they extend 
the analysis to the second digit distribution, which does not bring about convincing 
results. Also the true data contains far too many zeros due to rounding errors. A 
similar problem leads Porras and English (2004) to successfully test different vari-
ants of Benford’s Law, including one that excludes the digit 5. Bredl et al. (2012) 
come to the conclusion that their falsifiers diverge more from Benford’s Law than 
real respondents, although the difference is not very big. All in all, empirical evi-
dence is mixed. Nonetheless, Benford’s law is often simply assumed in scientific 
studies and used as an adequate means of detecting fraud, without verifying that, 
on the one hand, the real data follow the distribution and, on the other hand, that the 
falsifications do not (Diekmann & Jann 2010: 398).
Avoiding extreme categories (2)
It is usually assumed that falsifiers avoid the more obtrusive extreme categories in 
ordinal response scales, leading to smaller variances in faked data. Most empirical 
studies seem to find such differences in either the number of extreme categories 
or variances (e.g. Bredl et al. 2012; Kemper & Menold 2014; Schäfer et al. 2005). 
However, there are some exceptions: Menold & Kemper (2014) report inconsistent 
results and Schnell (1991) cannot find any effect, although he theoretically argues 
that falsifiers should generally underestimate the heterogeneity of respondents.
Strategic use of filter questions to shorten questionnaire (3)
An empirically rather uncontested hypothesis is that falsifiers make use of their 
knowledge about the filter branches in a questionnaire to find the shortest and easi-
est way through it (Menold & Kemper 2014; Brüderl, Huyer-May, & Schmiedeberg 
2013; Josten & Trappmann 2016). In other words, it should be a promising strat-
egy to take a closer look at the answers that interviewers gave to “gate questions” 
(Weinauer 2019), that is, questions that result in a list of follow-up questions. Alter-
natively, the number of inapplicable questions can be examined.
133 Walzenbach: Do Falsifiers Leave Traces?
Avoiding item-nonresponse (4)
For the remaining questions that cannot be avoided by filter questions, contrast-
ingly, it is believed that falsifiers provide answers more consistently throughout the 
questionnaire than real respondents because they do not want to raise suspicion. 
They hence should produce less item-nonresponse. Bredl et al. (2012) confirm this 
empirically, while Schnell (1991) finds the opposite effect.
Avoiding open answers (5)
Another common idea is that falsifiers should avoid open answers. This makes 
sense from a rational choice perspective: On the one hand because fictitious answers 
might be easily detected and on the other hand because it is comparatively burden-
some and time-consuming to invent and write down a plausible answer. Empiri-
cally, things seem less clear: While Bredl et al. (2012) find fewer “other”-answers in 
their falsifications, Menold & Kemper (2014) come to opposite conclusions. 
Hypotheses
After discussing these most common internal indicators, in the light of rational 
choice theory and with respect to prior findings from previous research, the sub-
sequent part of this paper will subject the indicators to an empirical test. If the 
traditional assumptions of rational behavior hold, we generally expect to see the 
following response patterns in falsified data:
Compared to authentic respondents, …
1) … falsifiers violate Benford’s Law when they report numbers.
2) … falsifiers choose fewer extreme categories on ordinal response scales.
3) … falsifiers use filter branches to shorten the questionnaire.
4) … falsifiers produce less item-nonresponse within their filter path.
5) … falsifiers give fewer open answers.
Trick question (6)
Apart from these rather commonly used indicators, we will also empirically test 
an unconventional approach to fraud detection, namely, a trick question which was 
deliberately designed and implemented as a potential method to identify fraud in 
this specific survey (for a different approach to trick questions where respondents 
are asked about fictitious words or newspapers, see Ziegler, Kemper, & Rammstedt 
2013; or Menold & Kemper 2014; Winker, Kruse, Menold, & Landrock 2015 for 
implementations).
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Respondents were asked for the European country with the highest income 
inequality. However, on their training, interviewers received false information 
about likely responses. As a consequence, we would expect falsifiers to avoid the 
presumably rare true answer “Portugal”, while unsuspicious Eastern European 
countries should be mentioned more often than in real interviews. 
These considerations result in the following additional hypotheses:
6a) … falsifiers avoid the presumably rare true answer “Portugal”.
6b) … falsifiers overestimate the share of mentioned Eastern European countries.
More details on the trick question are provided in the section on data and methods.
Data and Methods
To test the potential of the discussed indicators for fraud detection, we use data 
from a cross-sectional survey on the fairness of earnings, in which authentic cases 
of fraud were detected during fieldwork. The survey was part of the project “The 
factorial survey as a method for measuring attitudes in population surveys”, funded 
by the German Research Foundation (DFG). The questionnaire contained single-
item and vignette questions on income-related fairness perceptions, some knowl-
edge questions about income and labour in Germany, information on the respon-
dent’s own income, occupation and working environment, as well as questions on 
the respondent’s socio-demographic background and a social desirability scale. All 
in all, the questionnaire was of moderate length: 70% of face-to-face respondents 
completed the questionnaire in 20 to 30 minutes.
The survey was conducted nationwide among the residential population of 
Germany aged 18+. In about 50% of cases, data were collected by interviewers 
in computer-assisted face-to-face interviews (CAPI). The sampling strategy com-
prised the random selection of 129 sample points throughout Germany, a random 
route procedure and a Kish–selection grid. The other half of respondents was 
recruited via telephone by means of random digit dialing in combination with a 
Kish-selection grid. This group completed a self-administered paper or online ques-
tionnaire (PAPI/CAWI). Since there was no possibility for interviewer falsification 
in the self-administered sample, the present project focuses on the 821 interviews 
conducted in the face-to-face setting. The 803 self-administered questionnaires are 
only occasionally mentioned for purposes of comparison.
The fieldwork monitoring comprised a range of external control mechanisms: 
In a first step, re-contact via postcard and paradata of interview time and duration 
were used to identify suspicious cases. In a second step, the suspicious cases were 
subjected to repeated contact attempts by telephone and follow-up checks of the 
random route. This process identified 44 falsifications. These falsifications were 
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admitted by the interviewers and consequentially deleted in consultation with the 
survey agency. 
Fraud occurred in ten different sample points, seven of which were completely 
and three partially removed from the official data set. Since interviewer character-
istics were not made available for the faked data, we need to make the (reasonable) 
assumption that each sample point was assigned to one interviewer in order to cor-
rect for clustered standard errors in the significance tests throughout the empirical 
analyses of this paper. If this assumption is true, the faked data were produced by 
ten different falsifiers. Out of these, seven interviewers falsified all of their work 
(five to seven interviews), while three only falsified one or two of their interviews.1 
To capture this pattern adequately and allow for the fact that interviewers have not 
necessarily faked all of their assigned interviews, the subsequent analyses will be 
carried out on the interview level. Looking at the existing literature on interviewer 
falsifications, this is a somewhat unusual approach. However, it best reflects the 
nature of our data and accounts for the fact that the number of conducted interviews 
per interviewer is too small to run reliable analyses at the interviewer level.
With regard to the explanatory variables, indicators are generally obtained 
by summing up over all available questions and separately for each interview. Put 
concretely, this is done for the first and second digits of the monetary values, the 
extreme categories on ordinal scales, inapplicable questions, missing values in 
mandatory questions, and the prevalence of open answers. We will use all of these 
internal indicators to compare real and fake interviews in order to obtain informa-
tion on the extent to which falsifiers leave detectable traces within questionnaires. 
First, this will be done by descriptive comparisons between the two groups (page 
13-20). The statistical tests reported for the indicators 2 to 6 are tests for mean 
comparisons, Somers’D or tests of proportions dependent on the variable’s level 
of measurement. All of them use cluster-robust standard errors to account for the 
fact that interviews are nested within interviewers. In a second step, multivariate 
analyses are presented. In a logistic regression model, in which the dependent vari-
able indicates whether an interview was actually conducted or fabricated, we will 
assess the relative importance of the explanatory variables and identify the most 
promising indicators for fraud detection. Again, cluster-robust standard errors are 
applied to account for the fact that observations are not independent but nested 
within interviewers.
1 Apart from one exception, falsifiers had a workload of five to seven interviews per 
interviewer. There is one falsifier with a workload of 13 interviews who falsified one 
of them. On average, unsuspicious interviewers completed more, that is, 12 interviews. 
For unsuspicious interviewers, numbers ranged from two to 28 interviews per inter-
viewer.
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Before moving on to the results, the remaining part of this subsection will pro-
vide more details on the concrete survey questions that the individual explanatory 
indicators rely on. The full question wording is provided in Appendix B.
  Nonconformity with Benford’s Law (1)
The questionnaire contained five monetary variables that can be checked for 
their compliance with Benford’s Law: The estimated average monthly gross 
income for a full position in Germany, the respondent’s own monthly gross 
income, the own gross income that the respondent would perceive as fair, the 
net household income per month and the household income necessary to pay for 
recurring expenses. For all of these items, respondents were asked to provide 
an open answer. While the available number of numeric values is too small to 
conduct analyses at the level of individual interviews or interviewers, comparing 
the real and the faked data as a whole can produce valuable insights concerning 
the usability of the Benford distribution for fraud detection.
  Avoiding extreme categories (2)
To examine the shares of extreme response categories, we use two item bat-
teries with 7-point Likert response scales. These questions were answered by 
all respondents, that is, they could not be inapplicable. In the first item battery, 
respondents were asked to evaluate to which extent certain person characteris-
tics should have an impact on an employee’s fair gross income. This task was 
completed for eleven different characteristics (e.g. sex and education) using an 
ordinal scale ranging from 0 (“not important at all”) to 6 (“very important”). 
This item battery is followed by a social desirability scale, in which the respon-
dents assessed their own personality on the basis of six statements that they 
evaluated on a scale from 0 (“not applicable at all”) to 6 (“fully applicable”). 
Graph 3 shows the frequency of each response category for real and fabricated 
interviews across all 17 items.
  Strategic use of filter questions to shorten questionnaire (3)
Twenty of the survey questions can in principle be skipped due to filters. A falsi-
fier who knows the questionnaire could answer the filter questions strategically 
to shorten the questionnaire, resulting in higher numbers of inapplicable ques-
tions within filter paths. 
  Avoiding item-nonresponse (4)
There were 43 closed-ended questions that were mandatory for every respondent 
and could be subjected to an examination of item-nonresponse. The respective 
indicator consists of the sum of missing values in these questions.
  Avoiding open answers (5)
There are seven open answers in the questionnaire that can be used to test 
hypothesis 5. Three of them are open questions in the stricter sense of the word, 
namely the job title and description of the respondent’s current (or last) occu-
pation, a feedback question at the end of the questionnaire and a trick ques-
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tion on the European country with the highest income inequality (which we 
will come back to in in the results section). Apart from that, there were seven 
occasions in which respondents could specify additional options (“other, please 
specify:_________________”). This was possible for their current occupation, 
their main place of residence since birth, the sources of their household income, 
their party preference, their partner’s occupation, their highest educational 
degree, and their vocational qualifications. However, the latter three were not 
used by any respondent. We are hence left with seven potential open answers to 
analyze. For the descriptive analyses, the overall number of open answers serves 
as an indicator. For the regression model, we distinguish between completely 
open questions and text fields, where respondents could specify “other” options. 
  Trick question (6)
Implementing a trick question was an innovative attempt to detect fraudulent 
data in the setting of this specific survey. As part of an item battery that mea-
sured the respondents’ general knowledge of the survey topic, they were asked 
for the European country with the highest income inequality. In the training that 
all the interviewers underwent before the fieldwork period, interviewers were 
informed about the right answer (which was Portugal at the time). However, they 
were also told that only experts know this and that respondents would usually 
guess an „Eastern European country such as Poland or Romania“ (Sauer, Aus-
purg, Hinz, & Liebig 2010: 79). We will use the answer to the trick question to 
examine if such a trick question is helpful to detect fraud. This would be the 
case if falsifiers were more likely then real respondents to provide a presumably 
unsuspicious country, while avoiding the true but presumably rare answer. 
Results
Benford’s Law
Graph 2 compares the theoretically expected Benford distribution (curves) and the 
observed distribution (bars) separately for the first and the second digit and the real 
and the faked interviews (see Graph A1 in the appendix for the digit distributions in 
the self-administered survey modes).
A first obvious result is that there are considerable deviations from Benford’s 
Law for certain digits in all four subgroups. Looking at the first digit of the real 
data, it is noticeable that the digits one to three are overrepresented compared to 
Benford’s predictions, while the digits four to nine fall short of the expected per-
centages. Especially for numbers beginning with the digit two, the observed and 
expected values diverge strongly, with a difference of almost 15 percentage points. 
A look at the first digit distribution of the fabricated interviews reveals a similar 
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picture. The percentage of monetary values that begin with the digit two is even 
larger than in the real interviews: the observed value is 41% (and thus nine percent-
age points higher than in the case of the real interviews), while Benford’s expecta-
tion would range just under 18%. The probability for an initial digit one, on the 
other hand, is six percentage points below the 30% predicted by Benford.
For the second digit distribution, we find clearly elevated shares of zeros and 
fives: In the real data, the probability of observing these digits is 14 and 11 percent-
age points higher than expected, in the fabricated data it is 21 and 14 percentage 
points above Benford’s prediction. In line with the findings documented by some of 
the previous studies on Benford’s second digit (Porras & English 2004; Schräpler & 
Wagner 2003; Winker et al. 2015), this is clear evidence for rounding. Interestingly, 
this tendency is slightly more pronounced in the fabricated interviews (although the 
difference is not statistically significant).
To sum up, neither the authentic nor the fraudulent data followed Benford’s 
Law. Accordingly, chi-squared tests lead to a clear rejection of the hypothesis that 
the observed data follows Benford’s distribution for the four subgroups. 
Judging from this finding, we would advise studies with a higher workload per 
interviewer to consider taking an alternative approach: Instead of comparing fal-
Benford’s Law  
 
Real Interviews  









Graph 2 Compliance with Benford’s Law 
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sifications to Benford’s Law, each indiviudal interviewers’ numerical values could 
be compared to the empirical sample distribution (as suggested by Swanson, Cho, 
& Eltinge 2003; Winker 2016). Considering the small number of interviews per 
interviewer in this data set, we will refrain from looking further into such analyses 
on the interviewer level.
Extreme Categories on ordinal response scales
As Graph 3 shows, the average number of extreme categories is much lower in the 
faked data than it is for real interviews. This is true both for the lowest response 
category 0, which real respondents choose in 14% and falsifiers in 5% of all cases, 
and for the highest response category 6, which real respondents choose in 20%, and 
falsifiers in 8% of their answers (both differences in proportions are statistically 
significant with p<0.01). This means that, while falsifiers underestimate the share 
of extreme categories by nine to twelve percentage points, the middle categories - 
and here in particular category 4 - are more frequently chosen in the faked data.2
This result is in line with what we find if we sum up the standard deviations 
within the ordinal response scales for each interview. The average standard devia-
tion for the fake interviews is 1.51, for real interviews 1.94. Comparing the groups 




























response categories on ordinal response scales
Real interviews (N=777) Falsifications (N=44)
Graph 3 Pooled responses to 17 questions with ordinal response scales
2 To see if this result was driven by very few falsifiers, the average number of extreme 
values was individually looked at and compared to the the average number of extreme 
categories in the real interviews (which was 5.7). Only one out of ten falsifiers (who 
moreover only faked one interview) ticked a slightly higher number of extreme catego-
ries (namely 6). All other falsifiers behaved in line with our hypothesis. Five of them 
ticked an average of only 2 or fewer extreme categories per interview.
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Inapplicable questions in filter branches
We have argued that we would expect falsifiers to use filter branches that shorten 
the questionnaire. Graph 4 offers evidence that falsifiers indeed pursue this strat-
egy. It shows the absolute number of inapplicable questions, separately for real and 
fabricated data.
At a first glance, the distributions look similar: The majority of cases have 
between five and twelve inapplicable questions in filter paths (90% for real inter-
views and 73% for faked interviews), while a comparatively smaller group avoids 17 
or more questions. Differences are particularly evident in this upper part of the dis-
tribution. Compared to real interviewers, falsifiers are almost three times as likely 
to leave all 20 skippable questions unanswered (8% versus 23%; difference in pro-
portions is statistically significant with p<0.01).3
The filter path with the largest number of follow-up questions that can be 
skipped is the one on employment history and working conditions. Interviews can 
only be in the upper group with 17 to 20 inapplicable questions if the response to 
the filter question is unanswered or indicates that the respondent has never been in 
employment. Falsifiers had a strong incentive to answer this question in the nega-












questions:  23%* 
Graph 4 Number of inapplicable questions out of 20 questions in filter branch
3 As a robustness check, we individually compared each falsifier’s average number of 
inapplicable questions to the average in real interviews to see if results could be driven 
by very few outliers. 4 out of 10 falsifiers’ means ranged between 9.3 and 10, that is 
slightly lower than the average of 10.4 in real interviews. However, 6 out of 10 falsifiers 
showed the expected pattern and partly made extensive use of inapplicable questions to 
presumably shorten the questionnaire.
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Item-Nonresponse
Based on the questions that could not be avoided by filters, Graph 5 compares the 
number of missings in the real and the faked interviews. Our theoretical argument 
was that falsifiers should avoid missing values in the questions they cannot skip, 
because too much item-nonresponse might attract the survey agency’s attention.
In line with the expectations, falsifiers are more likely to produce question-
naires with zero missing values (50% versus 37%). However, this difference is not 







zero missings: 37% 
average: 1.43 
median: 0.5 
zero missings: 50% 
Graph 5 Item-nonresponse in 43 mandatory questions
4 When looking at the falsifiers’ mean numbers of missings, 5 out of 10 yield numbers 
below the average of real interviews, 4 of them even below 0.2. The other half ranges 
between 2.2 and 5 missings per interview. These results hint towards heterogeneous 
interviewer behaviours.
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Open answers
Graph 6 shows that there is no significant difference in the mean or median number 
of open answers between real and fabricated interviews. There is, however, a differ-
ence in whether open ended answers are given at all: 7% of real respondents do not 
give any open answers, compared to 23% of the falsifiers (difference in proportions 
is significant with p<0.05).5 
Additional analyses that compared the number of letters in open answers (if 
there were any) across groups have not revealed any differences in means or medi-






zero open answers: 7%* 
average:1.43 
median: 2 
zero open answers: 23%* 
Graph 6 Open answers to seven open questions
5 7 out of 10 falsifiers showed lower average numbers of open answers compared to the 
average in real interviews. Comparing the prevalences of interviews with zero open an-
swers, half of the falsifiers provided at least one open answer per interview. The other 
half had a likelihood of 29 to 100% to avoid open answers completely.
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Trick question 
Graph 7 shows the answers to the trick question. In addition to the real and the fab-
ricated personal interviews, the answers given in the self-administered (paper and 
web) questionnaires are also reported to provide a reference point to a respondent 
group that could not have been affected by interviewer fraud.6 
Interestingly and in line with hypothesis 6a, none of the falsified interviews 
mentioned the correct answer, Portugal. However, it was not a very frequent answer 
in the real interviews or in the self-administered questionnaires. The prevalence of 
Poland, Romania or other Eastern European countries did not differ enough (or in 
the expected direction) across groups to serve as an indicator for fraud in the face-




Graph 7 Answers to trick question on income inequality in Europe across 
modes
6 Recruitment into the two survey modes took place by drawing two separate random 
samples of the residential population of Germany (more information in Sauer et al. 
2010). For the purposes at hand, we are implicitly assuming that the random differences 
between samples do not affect the answers to the trick question.
 As one of the reviewers pointed out, self-administered questionnaires might still con-
tain falsifications if the survey agency added invented cases. Although this is a theo-
retical possibility, we have no reason whatsoever to believe that this happened in our 
data.
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As expected, the answer Portugal predicts perfectly that an interview is 
authentic. Since the other answers do not help to distinguish between real and faked 
interviews, the trick question will not be further analyzed in the following multi-
variate analyses. It will, however, be included as one of the open questions, which 
can either be answered or missing.
Multivariate analyses
To examine the relative importance of the different indicators, the next step is to use 
them as potential predictors for fraud in a logistic regression model. The dichoto-
mous dependent variable indicates whether an interview is real (coded as 0) or a 
case of known fraud (coded as 1). 
Table 1 summarizes all explanatory variables. For the indicators on extreme 
response categories and item-nonresponse, some categories at the upper end of the 
scale were grouped together due to small numbers of cases. 
Table 1 Explanatory variables in regression model
Variable Concept and Coding
extreme categories number of extreme categories on 17 items with 
ordinal response scales (continuous variable)
 hypothesis 2
item-nonresponse number of missings in mandatory/unfiltered 
questions (0/1/2/3+, specified as dummies)
 hypothesis 4
open: other answered any “other, please specify” category (0/1)  hypothesis 5
open: feedback answer to feedback question at the end of the survey 
(0/1)
 hypothesis 5
open: trick question answer to question on income inequality in Europe 
(0/1)
 hypothesis 5
occupation *  
inapplicable
open question on occupation  
(skipped / specified / missing)
number of inapplicable questions  
(5-9 “few”/ 10-12 “some”/ 16-20”many”)
0: occupation: skipped / inapplicable: many
1: occupation: specified / inapplicable:few
2: occupation: specified / inapplicable: some
3: occupation: missing / inapplicable: few
4: occupation: missing / inapplicable: some
 hypothesis 5
 hypothesis 3
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There is a peculiarity in the data concerning the open question that elicits 
the respondent’s current (or alternatively last) occupation. It is positioned within 
the longest filter branch of the questionnaire that was designed to collect informa-
tion on the respondent’s employment and working conditions. Failure to specify 
an occupation can thus stem from item-nonresponse or from skipping the entire 
filter branch. A high number of inapplicable questions essentially indicates that 
the complete filter branch on employment, including the item on occupation, was 
skipped. In terms of coding, this correlational pattern is reflected in the interaction 
of two categorical variables, the respondent’s reaction to the occupation question 
(skipped / missing / specified) and the number of inapplicable questions (few / some 
/ many). The reference category indicates an inapplicable occupation question and a 
generally high number of inapplicable questions due to filters throughout the ques-
tionnaire.
Apart from respondent occupation, all other open answers are captured by 
dichotomous variables. Since very few respondents specified additional informa-
tion in “other, please specify” categories, these questions were subsumed into one 
dummy variable indicating if any (versus no) open answer was provided.
Graph 8 shows the results of the logistic regression model (see Table A1 in 
the appendix for the full regression table). A first result is that there is a significant 
negative correlation between the number of extreme categories in the question-
naire and the log-odds that an interview was fabricated (p<0.01). This means that 
hypothesis 2 is clearly confirmed and falsifiers indeed avoided extreme answers 
on ordinal response scales. Equally clearly, we cannot find any evidence that item-
nonresponse is related to fraud (hypothesis 4). Regarding hypothesis 5, it is inter-
esting to note that the absence of open questions (or the numbers of letters in open 
answers as mentioned before) does not generally come with higher probabilities of 
falsification. However, if we look at the question on respondent occupation, ques-
tionnaires that contained a job description were significantly less likely to be falsi-
fications than interviews with item-nonresponse (p=0.08 for few inapplicable ques-
tions, p>0.01 for some inapplicable questions) or a skipped question (p<0.01 for few 
and some inapplicable questions). 
When it comes to inapplicable questions (hypothesis 3), regression coefficients 
for respondents that got filtered over few or some questions were very similar. Only 
a high number of skipped questions (including the occupation question) was predic-
tive for fraud in our data. This pattern somewhat suggests that the intention to skip 
the open question on occupation was the dominant one compared to finding the 
shortest path through the filter paths of the questionnaire.




Graph 8 Potential Indicators for Fraud (logistic regression)
Looking into descriptives, falsifiers report around three times as many respon-
dents who have never been in employment and thus automatically skip the 16 addi-
tional questions on employment (27.3 versus 9.5%). Among those who are asked 
about their current or previous occupation, 93.0% of the real interviews provide a 
job title, while only 81.3% of the falsifications do. With these considerable differ-
ences in response patterns, the question on the respondent’s occupation was very 
helpful in identifying fabricated interviews. Part of the explanation surely lies in 
how easy it would be to check the correctness of the answer. Respondents certainly 
remember what they do or did for work, and even other household members could 
presumably provide the right answer, e.g. in a follow-up check by phone. However, 
the question is not only easily verifiable but also easily avoidable by a strategic use 
of the filter paths. The combination of both peculiarities seems to explain its suc-
cess in identifying fraud.
Graph 9 translates the two significant indicators from the regression model 
into a visual illustration: It shows how the number of extreme categories and the 
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question on occupation interact.7 The y-axis of the graph on the left side shows the 
predicted probability that an interview has been fabricated.
At a first glance, the graph shows that the effect of one variable heavily depends 
on the other variable. Generally speaking, the probability of fraud decreases with 
an increasing number of selected extreme categories on the ordinal response scales 
of the questionnaire. This is even more so if the open question on the respondent’s 
occupation has not been answered - due to nonresponse or because the respective 
filter branch was skipped entirely. 
Within the groups of interviews that did not indicate any occupation, the pre-
dicted probability of fraud can rise to a maximum of 63% or 68% if zero extreme 
categories have been ticked. For interviews in which the occupation was specified, 
the slope is less steep and only climbs to 27% if we move towards the lower end 
of the x-axis indicating low numbers of extreme categories. Comparing the inter-
views with and without the open answer, the predicted probability of fraud hardly 
7 Graph 9 only refers to occupation rather than the interaction between occupation and 
inapplicable questions. This is justified by the fact that there weren’t any significant 
differences between the groups with few and some inapplicable questions in the previ-
ous model. In addition, the number of cases with a missing value for the occupation 
question seemed too small (N=55) to identify further subgroups (as can be seen by the 




Graph 9 Predicted probability for fraud dependent on the strongest predictors
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changes at the upper end of the scale, while the open answer accounts for a change 
of 36 to 41 percentage points if no extreme category was chosen. 
The illustration on the right side of Graph 9 treats interviews with a speci-
fied occupation as the reference category (straight line) and compares it to the two 
groups without valid answers (curves). The confidence intervals indicate that the 
group differences between the interviews with and without a specified occupation 
are significant if zero to three extreme categories were ticked and insignificant if 
four or more extreme categories were ticked.
Judging by the maximum changes in predicted probabilities that can be attrib-
uted to the variables, the results suggest that the number of extreme categories is an 
even stronger indicator of fraud than failing to provide a job title in a filter branch 
that falsifiers might want to skip.
Related findings: standard deviations, acquiescence and social desirability
Theoretically, we could have considered standard deviations in the ordinal response 
scales or the amount of straight lining (as done by Blasius & Thiessen 2018) instead 
of the number of extreme categories. Empirically, however, the number of ticked 
extreme categories was more strongly correlated with fraud and the standard devia-
tions did not add any explanatory power to the regression models once the model 
controlled for extreme categories. 
Following Kemper & Menold (2014), we tested two more alternatives to exam-
ining the extreme categories, namely acquiescence (in both ordinal response scales) 
and socially desirable answers (in the social desirability scale). In their paper on 
laboratory falsifications, Kemper & Menold (2014) report that falsifiers provide 
“overly positive self-descriptions” (p. 96) when asked about socially desirable 
behaviors as well as a higher tendency to acquiesce irrespective of question content. 
These results were not replicable with our data. Both options performed worse as 
indicators for fraud than the number of extreme categories. Generally, adding indi-
cators for self- and other-deception did not help the predictive power of the regres-
sion model. Descriptively, falsifiers tended to give negative self-descriptions in five 
out of six cases. Curiously, they were less likely to agree to the statement “I am 
always honest to others”. Although the difference between groups was not statisti-
cally significant, this finding would be in line with the argument that falsifiers use 
themselves as a reference point when fabricating data (see Landrock 2017).
Predicting fraud based on internal indicators alone?
In response to a reviewer comment, Table 2 presents the numbers of falsifications 
that would have been correctly classified. In other words, we are treating our data 
as a case of supervised learning relying on internal indicators (on interview level) 
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alone. As the analyses are carried out on the interview level, we are allowing for the 
situation that interviewers only faked some of their assigned interviews.
To predict fraud based on the logistic regression model, it makes sense to work 
with an educated guess about the expected share of falsifications instead of using 
the 50% mark as a cut-off point. Similar to ordinary clustering approaches, the 
method would otherwise be very likely to identify an unrealistically high number 
of falsifications (De Haas & Winter 2016). In this case, the upper 5% of interviews 
that were most suspicious from internal indicators are treated as falsifications.
The results suggest that only by taking internal indicators at interview level 
into account, we could have identified 22 out of 42 confirmed falsifications cor-
rectly. 20 would have remained undetected and there would have been 22 new sus-
picious cases (which could have been subjected to further checks if the internal 
indicators had been part of the quality control during fieldwork).
This little exercise highlights a point that has been made before: Internal indi-
cators seem to work well to identify some falsifications but not others (a finding that 
is confirmed by Thissen & Myers 2016). As a consequence, it is not reasonable to 
rely only on one type of indicator. Instead it should be the goal to combine as many 
as possible. In settings where the number of conducted interviews per interviewer 
is higher, internal indicators on interviewer level can supplement the internal indi-
cators on interview level that we used in this study. These could include dupli-
cate checks (Koczela, Furlong, McCarthy, & Mushtag 2015), analysis of similar 
response patterns in ordinal response scales (Blasius & Thiessen 2015), and com-
parisons of so-called “content-related patterns”, contrasting interviewer-specific 
and overall sample means (Kosyakova, Olbrich, Sakshaug, & Schwanhäuser 2019; 
Weinauer 2019).
To some extent (although in varying degrees), all internal indicators have the 
disadvantage that falsifiers will be able to adjust their response style if they are 
aware that a certain kind of check is in place (Winker 2016). However, the idea 
is not that one method will identify all falsifications, but that more checks will 
heigthen the chance of being detected and will make fraud less attractive to inter-





Prediction: real 757 22 779
Prediction: falsified 20 22 42
Total 777 44 821
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viewers. As Thissen & Myers (2016) put it: “Each method can be circumvented, but 
a combination of methods acts as a series of barriers, and patterns of falsification 
that might slip past one type of review may be caught by another.”
Conclusion
This study provides empirical insights into the response patterns of falsifiers. It 
contributes to a wider body of literature aiming to develop more efficient monitor-
ing strategies to prevent interviewer fraud and potential bias in surveys. For this 
purpose, we examined the potential of statistical ex-post analysis of response pat-
terns for the identification of fabricated data. In contrast to the wide majority of 
studies on interviewer fraud, we did not draw on laboratory falsifications but could 
rely on authentic cases of interviewer fraud stemming from a survey project on 
income inequality in Germany. Out of 821 face-to-face interviews, 44 were identi-
fied as falsifications by external control mechanisms and admitted as such by the 
survey agency. These data were particularly suitable to test the potential of internal 
indicators for fraud detection: To what extent do the attempts of falsifiers to pro-
duce unsuspicious data lead to recognizable response patterns?
Drawing on somewhat contradictory empirical evidence from previous stud-
ies, hypotheses were formulated as to how rationally acting falsifiers would navi-
gate through a questionnaire. Real and faked interviews were then compared with 
regard to various testable criteria, namely the number of selected extreme catego-
ries in ordinal response scales, answers to open-ended questions, item-nonresponse, 
strategic use of filter questions to shorten the questionnaire, and the compliance of 
reported numbers with Benford‘s Law. In addition, we reported results from an 
innovative trick question.
In the multivariate analysis, the avoidance of extreme categories on ordi-
nal response scales proved to be the strongest indicator for fraud. This approach 
also outperformed alternative indicators, namely socially desirable answers and 
acquiescence in the ordinal response scale. Apart from that, missing data in one 
particular open-ended question significantly predicted fraud: the open question 
on the respondent’s current or previous occupation. Missing values could occur 
either because the respondents refused to provide a job title or because they had 
never been in employment, in which case the interviewer was supposed to skip a 
filter branch of 16 questions on employment. None of the other open-ended ques-
tions, however, helped to detect fraud, and neither did the number of letters in open 
answers. This means that fewer or shorter open answers per se do not seem to be 
suitable indicators. Similarly, questionnaires with few and moderate numbers of 
inapplicable questions did not differ in their probability of being falsified. Only a 
high number of inapplicable questions (stemming from skipping the entire filter 
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branch on employment) was strongly correlated with fraudulent data. Although we 
cannot fully disentangle the effect of not answering an easily verifiable open-ended 
question and using filters to shorten the questionnaire, we can definitely say that the 
combination of both successfully identified fraud in our case.
Another interesting finding of the above analyses is that, contrary to the origi-
nal hypothesis, falsifiers and real respondents did not differ in their shares of item-
nonresponse. Apart from that, neither the implemented trick question nor Benford’s 
Law were helpful in detecting fraud. Although all falsifiers avoided the rare correct 
answer to the trick question, very few real respondents gave the correct answer. 
When comparing the first and the second digits of reported monetary values to 
Benford’s Law, this criterion proved to be highly problematic, since even the basic 
assumption that the authentic interviews should approximately follow the Benford 
distribution was violated. Judging from this finding, it seems more promising to 
experiment with rounding behavior (although differences failed to reach a signifi-
cant level in our data) or to compare individual clusters of interviews to the aver-
age empirical distribution (as suggested by Swanson, Cho, & Eltinge 2003; Winker 
2016). This approach can be pursued if the number of interviews per interviewer is 
sufficiently high to allow analyses at the interviewer level.
A limitation of this study is that we cannot rule out that, despite extensive 
checks, further unnoticed falsifications have remained in the data. Comparing the 
answers to the trick question and the digits from the monetary values to the ques-
tionnaires from the self-administered survey modes shows that this might be the 
case, although differences between real face-to-face interviews and self-adminis-
tered questionnaires could in principal also stem from imperfect randomisation, 
mode differences in non-response bias or response behavior. Despite these uncer-
tainties, the present study could show that more than half of our authentic cases of 
fraud which were detected by external control mechanisms would also have raised 
suspicion in a statistical ex-post analysis of their response patterns. This result can 
encourage researchers and survey agencies to use both types of indicators in com-
bination when identifying suspicious cases. 
One possible practical approach could be to run checks on response patterns 
more continuously during the fieldwork period. In line with AAPOR recommenda-
tions (AAPOR 2003), it is desirable to complement random picking of interviews 
with a more targeted strategy for additional quality control. This is where statistical 
approaches could help to identify suspicious cases for further checks. Ideally such 
a routine would already be at work during fieldwork, not after its completion. A 
corresponding statistical routine would have to identify outliers based on a set of 
internal indicators. This could be done by assigning suspicion points to interviews, 
by generating pareto charts of the collected paradata on a weekly basis (as sug-
gested by Gwartney 2013). Concrete advise for implementing statistical routines 
that identifiy suspicious interviewers who deviate significantly from the overall 
methods, data, analyses | 2021, Vol. 15(2), pp. 125-160 152 
sample mean has been provided by Weinauer (2019) and Kosyakova et al. (2019) 
who draw on the concept of “meta-indicators”.
Regarding the selection of internal indicators for statistical procedures, the 
presented results suggest that it is worth looking at the peculiarities of the specific 
questionnaire to e.g. identify high-risk questions that are easily verifiable or crucial 
for long filter paths. A general recommendation is to make use of as many indica-
tors as possible - internal and external ones - to identify and substantiate suspicions.
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Appendix A
 
Graph A1 Compliance with Benford’s Law in the self-administered surveys 
(N=803, 2612 digits)any) 
 
 
Graph A2 Number of letters in open answers (if any)
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Table A1 Potential indicators for fraud – regression table
Logistic Regression
explaining falsification (1=yes/0=no)



























t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Appendix B. Question Wording by Indicators
(for the original questionnaire in German language, see Sauer et al. 2010)
  Nonconformity with Benford’s Law
What do you think, what is the average gross income per month for a full time posi-
tion in Germany?
(This is the amount that employees receive from their employer before taxes and 
social security contributions are deducted.)
About __________ ,- Euro per month
What is your own monthly gross income from your employment?
(This is the amount that you receive from your employer before taxes and social 
security contributions are deducted. If you are self-employed, please fill in the 
average of what you earn per month.)
About __________ ,- Euro per month
In case you don’t perceive your own income as fair, what would be a fair monthly 
gross income for you?
About __________ ,- Euro per month
What is the monthly net income of your household overall?
(Please sum up all types of household income, including your own. This also 
includes income from rentals and royalties, pensions, unemployment, social secu-
rity and child benefits, rent subsidy and other types of income.)
About __________ ,- Euro per month
To cover for your running expenses, what is the minimum monthly net income that 
your household would need?
(Please specify the amount you need per month to cover for housing, food, clothes, 
heating and your personal basic needs.)
About __________ ,- Euro per month
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  Avoiding extreme categories
In your opinion, to what extent should the following factors matter for a fair gross 
income?
Age ……………………………….. not at all  0-1-2-3-4-5-6  very much
Sex ……………………………….. not at all  0-1-2-3-4-5-6  very much
Education ………………………… not at all  0-1-2-3-4-5-6  very much
Number of children ………………. not at all  0-1-2-3-4-5-6  very much
Job ………………………………... not at all  0-1-2-3-4-5-6  very much
Job experience …………………… not at all  0-1-2-3-4-5-6  very much
Health condition ………………….. not at all  0-1-2-3-4-5-6  very much
Time working for company ……… not at all  0-1-2-3-4-5-6  very much
Size of company …………………. not at all  0-1-2-3-4-5-6  very much
Economic situation of the company not at all  0-1-2-3-4-5-6  very much
Performance on the job …………... not at all  0-1-2-3-4-5-6  very much
To what extent do you agree with the following statements?
The first impression I have of people usually  
turns out to be right..…………………………… not at all  0-1-2-3-4-5-6  very much
I am usually very sure of my judgements..…… not at all  0-1-2-3-4-5-6  very much
I am not always aware of the reasons for my 
actions..………………………………………….. not at all  0-1-2-3-4-5-6  very much
It has happened that I kept too much change..... not at all  0-1-2-3-4-5-6  very much
I am always honest with other people…………. not at all  0-1-2-3-4-5-6  very much
I have never taken advantage of somebody….... not at all  0-1-2-3-4-5-6  very much
  Avoiding open answers
What is your current job, or what was your last job? Please specify the job title and 
describe your role exactly.
What do you think, which European country does currently have the highest 
income inequality?
We might have missed something that you consider important. Is there anything 
you want to add or comment on?

